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Over 500 years ago, a small band of Europeans sailed past the borders
of the map, encountered a previously unknown land and peoples-and
sought legal advice on how to proceed. The initial response, from royal
financiers of the voyage and their ecclesiastical supporters, focused on
gaining control of the new territory by claiming responsibility for its
inhabitants. Despite the juridical consensus surrounding this approach,
however, it required a century and a half of experimentation and debate
before one jurist was able to classify the identity of these new "subjects"
within the expansionist empire.
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I. TERRA INCOGNITA LEX I

Modem civic identity in the Western Hemisphere flows from the
original fifteenth century collision between Native American2 peoples of
the Caribbean and European explorers sailing under the Spanish flag.
Shortly after this unexpected event, European legal advisors turned to the
familiar language of medieval jurisprudence to assert sovereign control
over the previously unknown territory.3 In order to apply these legal
principles, the jurists first required a means of bridging the situational gap
between the Old World and the New. Just as metaphor provided a vehicle
for European explorers attempting to describe an unfamiliar continent, so
legal analogy offered an apparent means to equate portions of the
established legal order with the newly incorporated elements. Analogical
reasoning, designed to expand Spanish influence, thus provided the basis
for a new world order, aspects of which continue to inform the relationship
between national governments and indigenous peoples.4
The initial sequence of European law's transplantation to the Americas
is fairly straightforward. First contact between Indians and Europeans
yielded a series of descriptions intended for the royal financiers of the
voyage. The news of potentially valuable lands prompted Spain to stake
a legal claim, preferably through arguments sufficient to exclude other
European competitors. This claim, while aimed at the territory itself,
necessarily included a characterization of Spain's relationship with the
native inhabitants.
The ius commune, however, lacked a provision for newly "discovered"
peoples. They were neither Christian allies, nor Spanish subjects, nor
Muslim infidels. While they might be captured as slaves, such trade would
not support Spain's exclusive claim to the new lands. Medieval experience
did allow their designation as objects of missionary activity, with an eye
to conquering them should such overtures be refused. Yet even apparently

1. Unknown land, unknown law.
2. At the risk of anachronism, the terms "Native American," "Indian," and "native or
indigenous peoples" appear interchangeably throughout this Essay to describe the pre-contact
inhabitants of the Americas and their descendants. Similarly, as modem scholarship appears to lack
a culturally neutral term for the territory explored and occupied by European powers from the late
fifteenth century onward, the terms "Americas," "Western hemisphere," "New World," and
"Indies" appear throughout the work.
3. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990).

4. See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). While Chief Justice John
Marshall does not refer in his decision to European civil law or to the European jurists cited by the
parties, his characterization of Native American tribes as "dependent" is strikingly similar to the
conclusions of Spanish jurists. Id. at 596. For a useful collection of Latin American constitutional
provisions and legislation regarding indigenous peoples, see DERECHOS DE LOS PUEBLOS
INDIGENAS: LEGISLACION EN AMERICA LATINA (Gisela GonzTlez Guerra ed., 1999).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss1/6

2

Scafidi: Old Law in the New World: Soloranzo and the Analogical Constructi
THE SIXTH ANNUAL LATCRIT CONFERENCE

successful conversion seemed insufficient to prompt recognition of these
"gentle, naked" people as full-fledged Spaniards.
Complicating these attempts at legal classification was European
recognition of social classes, and in particular a ruling elite, among Native
American groups. As a practical matter, many Spaniards viewed influence
over and exploitation of Indian leaders as a strategy for controlling the

native population as a whole. Treatment of native elites as equal partners,
however, would undermine Spain's claim to the territory. The problem of
Native American legal status under European law remained ambiguous for
over a century, despite persistent discussion of colonial exploitation and
the periodic appearance of ineffective royal laws prohibiting such

behavior.
This Essay examines the efforts of seventeenth-century Spanish jurist
Juan de Sol6rzano Pereira to clarify Native American legal identity within

the Spanish social order through the use of legal analogy.5 Part IIdescribes
Sol6rzano's legal education and the sources of law that he brought to bear
on the problems of the Americas. In Part III, the Essay follows Sol6rzano
to his Peruvian post and outlines changes in the colonial legal regime. Part
IV returns to the discussion of indigenous legal status, outlining the early
debates, and then focusing on Sol6rzano's use of analogy to identify
Indians as "miserabilespersonae," a category including widows, orphans,

and other persons similarly in need of special protection under the law.
Although this classification of Indians among the dependent members of
European society endured through the end of Spanish colonial rule and
was consistent with the royal claim to the territory of New Spain, the
analogy ultimately proved insufficiently flexible to adapt to actual
circumstances. Part V briefly reviews both the attacks of Critical Legal
theorists on the validity of analogical reasoning and recent defenses of this
venerable method of legal analysis, as well as cognitive bases of metaphor
and analogy. Finally, Part VI offers preliminary conclusions about
Sol6rzano's use of analogical reasoning to construct indigenous peoples'
Western legal status and invites further discussion.
II. EUROPEAN SOURCES OF LAW
Juan de Sol6rzano Pereira was born in Madrid in 1575. His mother and
father, both Old Spanish petty nobility, were from the university towns of
Valladolid and Salamanca, respectively. At approximately age 12,
5. In terms of methodology, this Essay combines a legal history narrative with legal
realism's insights regarding the importance of agency and forms of legal reasoning. Critical Legal
Studies, and thus LatCrit, is one of several branches of modem jurisprudence that traces its
intellectual lineage to the realists. See NEIL DuXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
435-50 (1995); MORTON J.HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY

269-72 (1992).
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Sol6rzano followed his father into the legal profession, enrolling at the
University of Salamanca, the peninsula's most distinguished legal faculty.
He graduated in 1599 and began teaching shortly thereafter, receiving the
advanced degree of Doctor of Laws in 1608.6 This traditional legal
education formed the core of Sol6rzano's jurisprudence.
When Sol6rzano was a law student, the standard curriculum covered
the ius commune, or law common to all of Europe, rather than local or
national Spanish law." Although medieval and early modern jurists treated
the ius commune in many respects as one system,' it actually consisted of
two distinct branches.9 The first was Roman or civil law, based on the
Emperor Justinian's sixth-century Corpus iuris civilis, a landmark
compilation of laws and legal scholarship.'0 In the late eleventh century,
the legal community rediscovered the Digest, the section of Justinian that
excerpted and organized by subject matter the writings of great Roman
jurists." This rediscovery led to the establishment of law schools across
Europe and the rapid diffusion of Roman law.'" So highly regarded was the
Corpusiuris civilis, that jurists assumed it to contain sufficient material to
resolve any given legal question, 3 and centuries later still referred to it as
"written reason"-although this reverence for the text did not deter
multiple and competing schools of interpretation. 4 Indeed, the Spanish
government's attempt, over a century after Sol6rzano's graduation, to
force universities to replace the Roman law-based curriculum with
national law was met with such resistance from professors that the order
was ultimately repealed. 5
The second branch of the ius commune was canon or ecclesiastical law,
which included Biblical passages, statements of Church councils, writings
of Church fathers, Papal decisions, and other materials among its
6. For basic biographies of Sol6rzano, see JAVIER MALAo6N & Jost M. OTS CAPDEQUi,
SOL6RZANO Y LA POLMCA INDIANA 7-40 (1965); Jost TORRE REVELLO, ENSAYO BIOGRAFICO
SOBRE JUAN DE SOLORzANo PEREIA 15-25 (1929). Note that while modem orthography renders
his patronymic as "Pereira," it often appears as "Pereyra" in historical documents.
7. See MANLIO BELLOMO, THE COMWON LEGAL PAST OF EUROPE 1000-1800, at 124-25
(Lydia G. Cochrane trans., Catholic Univ. of Am. Press 1995) (1988) (noting the limited legal
curricula of late medieval and early modem universities); I ALFoNSo GARCIA-GALLO, MANUAL
DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ESPAOL §§ 599-603 (10th ed. 1984) (describing twelfth through
seventeenth century universities, with emphasis on the legal curriculum in Spain).
8. PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW INEUROPEAN HISTORY 52 (1999).
9. See id at 49-52.
10. Id. at 35.
11. Id. at 43.
12. Id. at 52-53.
13. Id. at 46.
14. See BELLOMO, supranote 7, at 224-25 (describing various approaches to the study of the
ius commune).
15. STEIN, supra note 8, at 106.
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authoritative texts.' 6 In the early twelfth century, a scholar named Gratian
attempted to organize this unwieldy mass of material in his Concordia
discordantiumcanonum, or Harmony of conflicting canons, and began to

use the volume as a textbook for law students.' 7 Over the course of the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, scholars updated Gratian's work with
additional compilations, and the resulting authoritative collection of
8 Although
ecclesiastical law became known as the Corpus iuriscanonici.1
many students, like Sol6rzano, were not members of the clergy, it
nevertheless became common for their university degrees to reflect
certification in both civil and canon law. 9
While the universities of Sol6rzano's era taught the "learned law,"
Spanish lawyers conducted the quotidian legal business of the empire
according to more localized rules. Collected royal legislation received
greatest deference, supplemented by local municipal charters or custom as
necessary.2° Only when these sources failed to address a particular issue
were lawyers and judges to apply Roman law, preferably by reference to
the Siete Partidas,a thirteenth century vernacular text commissioned to
introduce Roman and canon law principles into the peninsula.2' The
influence of the ius commune was not limited to the interstices of positive
law, however, as educated jurists looked to broader currents of European
jurisprudence in matters of procedure and interpretation.22 Sol6rzano's

legal education, while devoid of practical experience, thus prepared him
to engage in critical analysis of legal issues according to the highest
standards of the seventeenth century European legal community.
III. LAW INTHE INDIES

In 1609, one year after completing his doctoral degree, Sol6rzano
received a judicial appointment as oidor of the Royal Audiencia of Lima,
and the following year set sail for the Americas.23 He remained in that post
16. Id. at 49. For an accessible English-language description of the historical development
of canon law and its significance in Western jurisprudence, see JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL
CANON LAW (1995).

17. STEIN, supranote 8, at 49; BRUNDAGE, supra note 16, at 47-49. Modem scholars express
disagreement as to Gratian's identity, as well as the original date and content of what is often called
simply Gratian's Decretum. See also ANDERS WINRoTH, THE MAKING OF GRATIAN'S DECRETUM

(2000).
18. STEIN, supra note 8, at 50-51.
19. Id at 52.
20. CHARLES R. CrrsER, THE LEGAL CULTURE OF NORTHERN NEW SPAIN, 1700-18 10, at 3132(1995).
21. Id. at 32.
22. See STEIN, supra note 8, at 66 (describing the gradual acceptance of the Siete Partidas
among professionally trained judges).
23. MALAG6N & CAPDEQUI, supra note 6, at 14-15. For a glossary of terms intended to make
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for eighteen years, during which he married a criolla of a distinguished
family and witnessed the birth of eight children.24 This overseas
assignment might have proven routine and unimportant; after all, over a
century had passed since first contact between Native Americans and
Europeans, and many of the major public debates had given way to
established institutions. Instead, subsequent changes in the laws of the
Indies allowed Sol6rzano's Peruvian experience to form the basis for a
lasting contribution to Spanish colonial jurisprudence.
Upon Sol6rzano's arrival in Lima, the system of governance combined
the laws of Castile, which exercised claim to the region, with both royal
decrees regarding the Indies and local regulations created by European
officials and settlers." The Spanish legal system also recognized
indigenous law and custom, so long as they conflicted with neither
Christianity nor European law.26 Sol6rzano's position as a judge required
consideration of all of these sources of law, as well as facility in
determining which to apply. In 1614, however, King Philip III replaced
this extant patchwork of peninsular and colonial laws with a decree that
only laws formulated specifically for the New World or adopted by the
Council of the Indies would have force there. 2' The declaration placed
Sol6rzano at the forefront of a major reorganization of Spanish colonial
law.
Over the course of his career in the royal service, Sol6rzano became
not only an authoritative commentator on the laws of the Indies under
Spanish rule, but also a participant in the reorganization of those laws. His
first major commentary and legal defense of imperialism, De Indiarum
Iure, appeared in 1629, shortly after his return to Madrid; the second
volume of this work followed ten years later." In addition to this Latin
text, Sol6rzano, in 1647, published PoliticaIndiana, a modified version
in Spanish intended for wider distribution.29 Both the Latin and the

the history of Latin American law accessible to English-speaking scholars, see M.C. Mirow, Latin
American Legal History: Some EssentialSpanish Terms, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 43 (2001).
24. MALAGON & CAPDEQUI, supra note 6, at 16.
25. CUTTER, supra note 20, at 32; GARCIA-GALLO, supra note 7, § 777.
26. CUTrER, supranote 20, at 32; GARCIA-GALLO, supra note 7, § 777.
27. CUTTER, supranote 20, at 32; GARCIA-GALLO, supra note 7, § 777.
28. See ANTHONY PAGDEN, LORDS OF ALL THE WORLD: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE IN SPAIN,

BRITAIN AND FRANCE C. 1500-c. 1800, at 98 (1995) (noting that Sol6rzano's work offers a defense
of imperial ideology grounded in both scholasticism and Roman law).
29. JAMES MULDOON, THE AMERICAS IN THE SPANISH WORLD ORDER: THE JUSTIFICATION

FOR CONQUEST INTHE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 10 (1994). Muldoon notes that Sol6rzano was
ordered to remove certain detailed royal orders against mistreatment of Indians from the manuscript
of PoliticaIndiana in order to prevent these official descriptions of mistreatment from drawing the
attention of other European powers. Id. (quoting LEWIS HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA 90 (1949)).
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Spanish versions of Sol6rzano's work circulated widely throughout the
New World and were reprinted several times during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.30
While Sol6rzano also played a major role in collecting and
rationalizing the laws of the Indies following the 1614 decree, that project
did not proceed as expeditiously as the publication of his scholarly
commentaries. The Council of the Indies, including Sol6rzano himself,
approved an early version in 1636. 3' The official text of the Recopilaci6n
de leyes de las Indias, however, was not promulgated until 1680, some
twenty-five years after Sol6rzano's death.32 The fortuitous timing of
Sol6rzano's judicial appointment, together with a traditional legal
education that informed his analysis of colonial jurisprudence,
nevertheless secured his position as an influential force in the history of
Latin American law.
IV. LAW FOR THE INDIANS

As Sol6rzano worked to construct what became the definitive legal
argument for Spanish activities in the New World, one of the major
unresolved issues was the legal "status" of Native Americans within
Spanish society. Despite a century of debate, including significant currents
of thought that emerged from Sol6rzano's own alma mater, a mass of ad
hoc legal enactments governed Indian-European interactions. Diversity
among indigenous peoples and changing demographics further
complicated the search for a unified legal structure. Lima, for example,
was a city of 60,000 people, of whom 30,000 were slaves of African
descent, 25,000 were considered Spanish, and a mere 5,000 were Indians.33
While the daly life of an indio compelled to render service to the Spanish
state may have been little different from that of an esclavo, Indians were
nevertheless a separate group from slaves, who were treated as chattels,
and were subject to different rules. Sol6rzano's attempts to articulate a
precise classification of this distinct minority group within the formalist
Spanish legal system formed an important part of his work, and one that
may offer insight into the deepest roots of the modem legal identity of
indigenous peoples in the Americas.

30. MULDOON, supra note 29, at 10.
31. See GARCIA-GALLO, supra note 7, § 785 (describing the series of efforts that led to the
promulgation of the Recopilacidn).
32. Id.
33. MALAGON & CAPDEQUi, supra note 6, at 18.
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A. HistoricalDebate: Indian Identity and Legal Status
From Queen Isabella's frequently quoted reprimand of Columbus for
attempting to initiate a slave trade in her Native American "vassals," 4 to
the famous debates between Bartolom6 de Las Casas and Juan Gin6s de
Sepdlveda at Valladolid," early European attempts to characterize the
previously unknown American peoples polarized the empire. The first
eyewitness report from the "Indies," the widely circulated letter attributed
to Columbus, enthusiastically described many of the native peoples as
gentle, unsophisticated, unclothed, and lacking in any "ill-will [or]
treachery."36 By contrast, the letter also warned against certain islands
inhabited by armed cannibals. 3" Although simplistic and inaccurate,
Columbus's words laid the foundations for two competing theories
regarding the nature of the Indians: either they were "noble savages,"
endowed with a wide range of simple virtues, or they were mere "beasts,"
greedy, savage, and idolatrous.38 More informed, moderate, and nuanced
ethnographic information would gradually inform this national debate, in
part through the testimony of indigenous peoples themselves, but the
argument's general parameters influenced royal policy throughout the
colonial period.
The intensity of the debate might have waned in the decades following
first contact between Native Americans and Europeans were it not for the

political and theological ramifications of the issue. Spain had predicated
its original claim to territory in the New World on a missionary "duty" to
subject the Indians to Christian rule and thus convert them. In the 1493
bull Inter caetera, the Pope recognized this claim and assigned a large
portion of the region and its inhabitants to Castile. This constructed
understanding of the Spanish presence in the Americas led directly to the
encomienda system, which entrusted groups of Indians to individual
Spaniards who were responsible for their religious and cultural training
and protection.39 In practice, the system allowed an encomenderoto exact
heavy tributes from "his" (or occasionally her) Indians, and fostered many

of the abuses of chattel slavery, including removal from home villages and

34. HANKE, supra note 29, at 20.
35. Id. at !1.For the arguments ofLas Casas, see BARTOLOMlp DE LAS CASAS, INDEFENSE
OF THE INDIANS (1992).
36. Margarita Zamora, Christopher Columbus's "Letter to the Sovereigns": Announcing the

Discovery, in NEW WORLD ENCOUNTERS 1,4 (Stephen Greenblatt ed., 1993).

37. Id. at8.
38. See HANKE, supra note 29, at 11-12 (describing the sixteenth century conflict regarding
the nature of the Indians).
39. See generally LESLEY BYRD SIMPSON, THE ENCOMIENDA INNEW SPAIN: THE BEGINNING
OF SPANISH MEXICO (1966).
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forced labor. Although the crown issued a steady stream of decrees
designed to curb the atrocities of the colonists,40 many believed that the
Indians' "brutish" or "barbaric" nature required subjugation through harsh
controls.4 ' Those on the other side of the debate, including the Dominican
and former encomendero Bartolom6 de Las Casas, supported a policy of
converting the "docile and clever" native peoples to Christianity through
teaching and persuasion.4 Beliefs regarding the nature and character of
Native Americans were thus central to Spain's Catholic religious identity
and exercise of imperial power.
In the realm of academia, the sixteenth century debate over the "nature"
of the Indians led to a new union of jurisprudence and theology centered
at the University of Salamanca. Its leading proponent was the Dominican
theologian Francisco de Vitoria, who believed that law should interpret
and reflect the divine will apparent in nature, including the unequal status
of persons.43 This theory supported both the need for governmental
structures and the exercise of power over individuals, such as the
encomienda system. Vitoria also argued, however, that the Church did not
exercise universal temporal authority over nonbelievers, and that Spain
required grounds other than the 1493 papal donation for its claims in the
New World-a point of view shared by competing European powers."
Lawful control over non-Christian lands might instead, in Vitoria's view,
arise from the need to exercise moderate force in order to preach the
gospel. 45 Since this argument focused on nonbelievers' receptivity to
Christianity, and on the potential use of just war in the service of
missionary activity, it once again drew attention to the essential question
of the Indians' character and normative legal status.
B. Sol6rzano's Synthesis: MiserabilesPersonae
The value of Sol6rzano's treatment of the issue of Native American
legal status, and of colonial jurisprudence more generally, lay not in
original argument or polemical description but in an orderly approach to
harmonizing a century of debate and ad hoc decrees with pre-existing legal
structures. His PoliticaIndiana consists of six books, the first of which
addresses the threshold question of Spanish title to the Indies, while the
second turns to the question of indigenous status. After discussing specific
forms of labor and desired conditions, Sol6rzano concluded "[t]hat the
Indians are and should be counted among those persons whom the law
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See generally RECOPILAC1ON DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS 1681 (1987).
LAS CASAS, supra note 35, at 11-16.
Id. at 362.
BELLOO, supra note 7, at 226-28.
HANKE, supra note 29, at 150-52.
Id at 151.
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calls miserables . . . ." In this context, the term is categorical rather than
merely descriptive. While Sol6rzano did consider many Indians to be
among the "poor and wretched" of the earth, comparing them to Job and
other suffering Biblical figures,47 his primary intent as a jurist was to
establish for them a definitive legal status, in this case the canonical
category known in Latin as miserabilespersonae.
In order to rationalize the existing body of Indian law according to the
principles of the ius commune, Sol6rzano's preliminary task was to assign
a group identity. Rather than rely directly on his own impressions from
nearly two decades in the Audiencia of Lima, he cited other authors to
describe both the Native Americans' "humble, servile, and submissive
condition"49 and, even when their suffering did not reach Biblical
proportions, their position as recent converts was noted for "ignorance,
lack of sophistication, poverty, and faintheartedness. 50 Sol6rzano went on
to discuss the Indians' need for protection against mistreatment, not only
for their own benefit but also because they are the "feet" of the republic
without which it cannot stand.5 Largely absent from this account is
consideration of hispanicized indios ladinos, including those who were
able to win small but significant victories within the Spanish system of
justice 52 or compose a book-length work intended to inform the crown of
colonial abuses.53 Instead, Sol6rzano relied on his elite, educated
perspective to gather documentary evidence characterizing Native
Americans as a relatively homogenous group in need of Spanish
protection.
Once Sol6rzano had established a working description of Indian
identity, he was able to assign the group to an existing category of
European law. According to the canonists, the Church had a special duty
to protect miserabiles personae, a term used to describe widows and
46. JUAN SOL6RZANO PEREYRA, POLITICA INDIANA 2.28 (Francisco Tomis Valiente & Ana
Maria Barrero eds., Biblioteca Castro 1996) (1647) (author's translation) [hereinafter POLJTICA
INDIANA].

47. Id. at 2.28.2.
48. See Laurent Mayali, Le droit des autres dan la France mivale: Syst~me de
diff~renciation et mode d'harmonisaiion,in IDENTrrT ET DRorr DE L'AuTRE 183, 183 (Laurent
Mayali ed., 1994) (noting that while approaches to the issue differ across legal systems, the initial
problem is defined in terms of identity).
49. POLfTICA INDIANA, supra note 46, at 2.28.1.
50. POLfTICA INDIANA, supra note 46, at 2.28.3.
51. POLITICA INDIANA, supra note 46, at 2.28.20.
52. See, e.g., STEVE J. STERN, PERU'S INDIAN PEOPLES AND THE CHAUENGE OF SPANISH

CONQUEST: HUAMANGA TO 1640, at 114-37 (2d ed. 1993) (describing Indians' successful use of
the court system to, inter alia, reduce payment of tributes and pursue land claims).
53. See generally ROLENA ADORNO, GUAMAN POMA: WRITING AND RESISTANCE IN
COLONIAL PERU (2d ed. 2000) (analyzing the work of sixteenth and seventeenth century Native

American author Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala).
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orphans in particular, as well as those who were old, blind, mutilated,
worn-down by long sickness, or poor and oppressed in general. 4 The
breadth of this category, which Sol6rzano defined simply as "all those
whom we naturally pity because of their status, capacity, and labors,""
could easily accommodate an additional group characterized by their
alleged need for protection. By analogy, then, the indigenous peoples of
the Americas became miserabilespersonae,and the Spanish government
acted as their guardians on behalf of the Catholic Church.
Although the purported benefits of this dependent status under canon
law were limited, Sol6rzano compiled a wider range of legal "protections"
on the basis of existing colonial laws. Traditionally, miserabilespersonae
enjoyed only the option of bringing their cases directly before an

ecclesiastical court rather than seeking justice in the secular realm. 6
Influential commentary on the law, however, suggested that this special
original jurisdiction would apply only if the litigant were actually poor and
powerless; wealthy widows and others who were technically miserabiles
but not in actual need of protection could appeal to the Church only after
failing in the first instance to obtain justice from a secular court."'
Ordinary litigants, by contrast, could appeal to ecclesiastical courts only
as a last resort after exhausting all avenues of secular justice." In his
expansion and adaptation of the concept of miserabilespersonae, the
former oidor did not limit himself to shifting jurisdiction away from the
royal courts, in which he had once served, to potentially more sympathetic
ecclesiastical courts. Instead, he focused on guidelines for judicial
treatment of Native Americans and specific provisions drawn from both
Roman and canon law. Among these were the admonition "that trials and
court cases involving Indians, especially poor ones, be concluded quickly
and with paternal love,"5 9 limitations on contractual capacity intended to
protect against alienation of goods,' and the presence of "protectors" to
provide legal assistance. 6' Later, in the third book of Politica Indiana,
Sol6rzano employed a similar method to support the continuance of the
encomiendasystem while reasserting the importance of safeguards against
abuse. This reinterpretation of the duty owed to miserabiles personae
allowed Sol6rzano to collect many of the ad hoc royal protections and

54. BRIAN TIERNEY, MEDIEVAL POOR LAW: A SKETCH OF CANONICAL THEORY AND ITS
APPLICATION IN ENGLAND 15-19 (1959) (citing Decretum Gratian, Dist. 84 ante c. 1; Innocent IV,
Commentaria ad X 1.29.38).
55. POLITICA INDIANA, supra note 46, at 2.28.1 (author's translation).
56. TIERNEY, supra note 54.
57. Id. at 18-19 (citing Innocent IV, Commentaria adX 1.29.3).
58. Id.
59. PoLITICA INDIANA, supra note 46, at 2.28.27 (author's translation).
60. POLITICA INDIANA, supra note 46, at 2.28.42-45.
61. POLITICA INDIANA, supra note 46, at 2.28.46-52.
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reforms of the first century and a half of Spanish colonial law under the
umbrella of the ius commune.
Using legal analogy and the analytical techniques of the learned law,
Sol6rzano incorporated the original inhabitants of the New World into the
jurisprudence of the old, establishing an Indian identity and formal legal
status that would endure for another 150 years.
V. ON ANALOGICAL REASONING

Although analogy is a venerable method of legal reasoning, its validity
has been challenged in recent years. Roberto Unger and other Critical
Legal theorists have argued that analogical reasoning is incoherent outside
its own cultural context, and thus incapable of yielding just results in a
heterogeneous society.62 Quite so, since epithets such as "childlike" or
"savage" are likely to mean very different things in different cultures, and
near-nudity on Caribbean beaches today is unlikely to justify foreign
conquest. By this account, Sol6rzano's use of analogy to categorize
peoples and govern lands largely foreign to him is extremely suspect.
As one modem judge has pointed out, however, the use of legal
analogy remains in good repute among members of the bar, and thus in
little danger of disappearance.63 Cognitive science, moreover,
demonstrates that human beings have an innate tendency to analogize and
to create categories; in other words, analogical reasoning is part of human
hardwiring. 4 In light of these twin pillars of tradition and nature
supporting the continued use of legal analogy, the contemporary legal
community may enjoy more success if it attempts to re-examine this
62. See, e.g., Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV.

L. REV. 561, 570 (1983).
63. Robert E. Keeton, Statutory Analogy, Purpose, and Policy in Legal Reasoning: Live
Lobsters and a Tiger Cub in the Park, 52 MD. L. REV. 1192, 1213 (1993).
64. Keith J. Holyoak et al., Introduction: The Place of Analogy in Cognition, in THE
ANALOGICAL MIND: PERSPECTIVES FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE 1, 2 (Dedre Gentner et al. eds.,
2001). An approachable introduction to the realm of metaphor and cognitive thought is GEORGE
LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980). Other recent works exploring
analogical reasoning from a variety of perspectives include METAPHOR AND THOUGHT (Andrew
Ortony ed., 1993) (indicating a cross-disciplinary collection of essays); KEITH J.HOLYOAK& PAUL
THAGARD, MENTAL LEAPS: ANALOGY INCREATIVE THOUGHT (1995) (noting an extended account
of the mechanism and applications of analogy); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY
IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) (wideranging exploration of the relationship between the embodied mind and philosophical inquiry); and
BARBARA MARIA STAFFORD, VISUAL ANALOGY: CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE ART OF CONNECTING

(1999) (noting an account of analogy from the perspective of an art historian).
In addition, a related legal study on employment discrimination offers an in-depth exploration
of the relationship between cognitive processes of categorization and formation of potentially
harmful stereotypes. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discriminationand EqualEmployment Opportunity,47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).
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method of reasoning rather than simply overturning it. Essential to this
enterprise are two questions: Are there benefits to analogical reasoning,
particularly in the construction of socio-legal identity? And, is it possible
to circumvent its parochial tendencies?
Cass Sunstein has provided a moderate defense ofanalogical reasoning,
albeit while claiming a preference for Rawlsian "reflective equilibrium,"'
and Sol6rzano's seventeenth-century attempt to rationalize Native
American legal status according to the norms of his era offers a
hypothetical object for this new perspective. Sunstein identifies several
benefits to the use of legal analogy, all stemming from the "incomplete
theorization" of analogical reasoning. Two of these potential benefits are
particularly applicable to the issue of indigenous legal status under Spanish
colonial rule. The first significant advantage is that those who cannot reach
agreement on general principles may be able to agree on the outcome of
a particular case through legal analogy." This formulation suggests that in
the Americas, decades of debate over the essential identity of the Indians
might have been circumvented by an earlier appeal to legal analogy. It is
plausible to imagine that Dominican friars like Las Casas seeking fair
treatment for Native Americans under the law and royal governors seeking
to police the abuses of the encomienda system in order to avoid
international disapprobation might agree that Indians seeking access to
justice would need special protection, not unlike the existing categories of
miserabilespersonae, even if they could not reach immediate agreement
as to the Indians' nature and character.
The second significant advantage is that analogical reasoning allows
moral evaluation over time because it is open to new facts and
perspectives,67 at least when unencumbered by the fixed categories of a
formalist legal system. In Spanish colonial terms, it is possible that the
steadily increasing ability of many disempowered groups of people,
including Indians, to exercise influence and to assert their limited rights
within the legal system might have prompted a revision of Sol6rzano's
analogy. To speculate further, it is possible that such a revised analogy
might have led to a more inclusive formulation of Spanish citizenship, or
even the possibility of multiple group affiliations, rather than a series of
revolutions against an oppressive colonial power.
Legal analogy is a basic tool from the lawyer's workbench, and one
that we need to examine further, rather than unsuccessfully attempt to

65. Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARv. L. REv. 741, 751 (1993). For
another analysis and reconsideration of legal analogy, see Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning:
Semantics, Pragmatics,andthe RationalForceofLegalArgument byAnalogy, 109 HARV. L. REV.
925 (1996).
66. Sunstein, supra note 65, at 782.
67. Id.
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discard, in order to avoid cultural incomprehensibility or oppression. In the
context of socio-legal identity, an important threshold issue is whether and
how a legal system focused on individual rights can also be capable of
protecting group identity. If legal analogy appears to be an avenue for such
protection, jurists must attempt to ensure that the modem realist legal
system is flexible enough to protect groups of people without reifying
them. Perhaps most importantly, if legal analogy is used to define sociolegal categories, the law must provide for group boundaries to remain
permeable and group identity to retain the opportunity to evolve.
VI. CHECKING THE REARVIEW MIRROR

In the mid-seventeenth century, an ordinary Spanish civil service
lawyer undertook to situate the indigenous peoples of the Americas within
the established categories of the formalist European legal system, an
organizational task that had thus far eluded a society preoccupied by the
complexities and opportunities of a newly "discovered" world. Reasoning
from time-honored principles of medieval law, he discovered that legal
analogy would allow him to identify Native Americans with the poor,
wretched members of European society. Analogy ossified into a set of
rules and expectations, and Indians-elite and otherwise-became wards

to be educated and protected by guardians under the special protection of
the Spanish legal system. This compact legal theorem, though
inconsistently applied at the local level, gave the crown claim to the
"Indies" and reclassified the native population as eligible for membership
in a dependent class of Spanish subjects. As one might predict of the
construction of a subordinate group within a formalist legal system,

however, one inconsistency still remained: the apparent lack of a
mechanism to ensure full participation in society when the characteristics
used to justify dependency had dissipated. Eventually, this legal rigidity
contributed to the crumbling of the entire colonial system.
By attempting to apply the rule of law to a rapidly growing and
changing sphere of influence through the use of analogical reasoning,
Spain accepted a challenge familiar to both ancient and modem legal
systems. Its resulting legal process displayed many evident flaws, in
particular the near-complete absence of indigenous participation. The
historical evolution of this jurisprudence, alongside an early national
debate surrounding the construction of an empire incorporating multiple
populations, is nevertheless a significant and overlooked chapter in the
evolution of Western law.
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